Systems And Methods For Detecting Call Provenance From Call Audio by Balasubramaniyan, Vijay et al.
c12) United States Patent 
Balasubramaniyan et al. 
(54) SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR DETECTING 
CALL PROVENANCE FROM CALL AUDIO 
(75) Inventors: Vijay Balasubramaniyan, Atlanta, GA 
(US); Mustaque Ahamad, Atlanta, GA 
(US); Patrick Gerard Traynor, 
Decatur, GA (US); Michael Thomas 
Hunter, Atlanta, GA (US); Aamir 
Poonawalla, Atlanta, GA (US) 
(73) Assignee: Georgia Tech Research Corporation, 
Atlanta, GA (US) 
( *) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term ofthis 
patent is extended or adjusted under 35 
U.S.C. 154(b) by 36 days. 
(21) Appl. No.: 13/807,837 
(22) PCT Filed: Jun.29,2011 
(86) PCT No.: PCT/US2011/042410 
§ 371 (c)(l), 
(2), ( 4) Date: Dec. 31, 2012 
(87) PCT Pub. No.: W02012/006171 
PCT Pub. Date: Jan. 12, 2012 
(65) Prior Publication Data 
US 2013/0109358Al May 2, 2013 
Related U.S. Application Data 
(60) Provisional application No. 61/359,586, filed on Jun. 
29, 2010. 
(51) Int. Cl. 
H04M 1168 
H04Wl2/02 
H04W24/08 
(52) U.S. Cl. 
(2006.01) 
(2009.01) 
(2009.01) 
CPC .............. H04W 12102 (2013.01); H04W 24108 
(2013.01) 
I lllll llllllll Ill lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll 111111111111111111111111111111111 
US009037113B2 
(10) Patent No.: US 9,037,113 B2 
May 19, 2015 (45) Date of Patent: 
(58) Field of Classification Search 
CPC ..... H04W 76/00; H04W 76/02; H04W 12/06; 
H04W 12/08; H04W 40/00; H04W 24/08; 
H04W 24/10 
USPC ............... 455/403, 410, 411, 412.1, 450, 451 
See application file for complete search history. 
(56) References Cited 
U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS 
6,256,606 Bl 
7,171,355 Bl 
712001 Thyssen et al. 
1/2007 Chen 
(Continued) 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
International Search Report and Written Opinion dated Jan. 13, 2012 
for related PCT Patent Application No. PCT/US201 l/042410. 
Primary Examiner - Jean Gelin 
(74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm - Troutman Sanders LLP; 
Ryan A. Schneider; Jay R. Anderson 
(57) ABSTRACT 
Various embodiments of the invention are detection systems 
and methods for detecting call provenance based on call 
audio.An exemplary embodiment of the detection system can 
comprise a characterization unit, a labeling unit, and an iden-
tification unit. The characterization unit can extract various 
characteristics of networks through which a call traversed, 
based on call audio. The labeling unit can be trained on prior 
call data and can identify one or more codecs used to encode 
the call, based on the call audio. The identification unit can 
utilize the characteristics of traversed networks and the iden-
tified codecs, and based on this information, the identification 
unit can provide a provenance fingerprint for the call. Based 
on the call provenance fingerprint, the detection system can 
identify, verify, or provide forensic information about a call 
audio source. 
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SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR DETECTING 
CALL PROVENANCE FROM CALL AUDIO 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
2 
sively dial a large number of customers while forging the 
Caller-IDs of the applicable banks. 
Similarly, fraudsters have used phishing emails that ask a 
bank's customers to dial *67 followed by a phone number that 
is claimed to belong to the bank but in reality belongs to a 
fraudster. After a customer follows these instructions, all 
further phone calls going to the customer phone are for-
warded to the fraudster' s number. Therefore anytime the bank 
attempts to call the customer, the call instead reaches the 
This application is a U.S. National Stage of International 
Application No. PCT/US2011/042410, filed 29 Jun. 2011, 
which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 
61/359,586, filed 29 Jun. 2010, the entire contents and sub-
stance of which are hereby incorporated by reference as if 
fully set forth below. 
10 fraudster, which breaks many of the multi-factor authentica-
tion mechanisms currently employed by various banks. 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
15 
SUMMARY 
For various reasons, including the above, there is a need for 
detection systems and methods to detect all or part of the true 
provenance of a call. It is to such systems and methods that 
various embodiments of the invention are directed. 
Various embodiments of the invention are systems and 
Various embodiments of the invention relate to telecom-
munications call analysis and, more particularly, to systems 
and methods for detecting call provenance, which may be a 
source and path taken by a call, based on audio of the call. 
BACKGROUND 
20 methods to detect call provenance based on call audio, thus 
not relying on metadata of a call. Briefly described, an exem-
plary embodiment of a detection system can comprise a char-
acterization unit, a training unit, and a prediction unit. 
Telephony networks are exceedingly complex systems. The characterization unit can extract various characteris-
While once designed, manufactured, and run by a single 
company, today's telephone networks are an elaborate com-
bination of many different technologies. 
25 tics of at least a portion of the audio of a call stream, where 
those characteristics may be a product of using a particular 
phone or of traversing particular networks. Such characteris-
tics may therefore act as forensic information about the call 
stream. For example, and not limitation, the characterization 
There are three general classes of telephony networks: 
public switched telephone networks (PSTNs), cellular net-
works, and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) networks. 
PSTNs are traditional, circuit-switched telephony systems. 
These networks are generally characterized by lossless con-
nections and high fidelity audio. Components of the cores of 
some PSTNs are being replaced by internet protocol (IP) 
connections, but private links of PSTNs remain tightly con-
trolled to ensure near-zero packet loss. Like PSTN systems, 
cellular networks have a circuit-switched core, with portions 
currently being replaced by IP links. While these networks 
can have considerably different technologies deployed in 
their wireless interfaces, the cores of cellular networks are 40 
extremely similar to PSTN networks. Lastly, VoIP networks 
run on top of IP links and generally share paths as other 
Internet-based traffic. 
The current telephony infrastructure allows users to com-
municate using a variety of technologies. Circuit-switched 
landlines continue to provide telephony to the majority of 
homes and businesses. Mobile phones now offer service to 
more than four billion users over cellular networks. VoIP 
30 unit can determine a noise profile for a call audio. The char-
acterization unit can also detect packet loss and can identify a 
concealment algorithm used to regenerate lost packets. Infor-
mation determined by the characterization unit may be 
indicative of one or more participating phones of a call or of 
35 various specific networks traversed by the call and can thus be 
used by the detection system to identify, verify, or provide 
forensic information about a participating phone or all or part 
of a route of the call. 
For a particular call audio, the training unit can use features 
extracted by the characterization unit and can attach specific 
labels to the call based on prior knowledge about the call. On 
being provided with a set of training calls, along with the 
training calls' features and labels, the training unit can learn a 
first model for modeling an association between the features 
45 and the labels. In an exemplary embodiment the labels can be 
indications of one or more codecs used to encode the call 
audio. In an exemplary embodiment, the training unit can 
then use a multi-label classifier to model the association 
allows users to inexpensively communicate with each other 
irrespective of the geographical distances, using mobile 50 
phones and other computing devices. Each of these telecom-
munication networks adopts its own set of standards, includ-
ing underlying transport protocols and codecs used, yet they 
seamlessly interact through a variety of conversion mecha-
nisms. A call may traverse multiple types of networks, taking 55 
advantage of the benefits offered by each before reaching its 
final destination. 
between the features and the multiple codecs. The model can 
be used to predict the codecs (i.e., labels) for a new call. The 
codecs in turn can be used to determine which types of net-
works were traversed by the call. 
In some instances, the set oflabels for a call can be a unique 
identifier for a particular phone. In such an instance, the 
training unit 120 can learn a second model that associates the 
features with this unique identifier. Thus, the detection sys-
tem 100 can comprise or access a first model for mapping 
features to codecs and a second model for mapping features to 
call audio sources. If the audio being analyzed is of the calling 
The diversification of telephony infrastructure signifi-
cantly reduces the integrity associated with call metadata, 
such as caller identification, because metadata is either not 
transferred across these networks or is transferred without 
verification. As a result, metadata can be easily manipulated 
60 party, the detection system 100 behaves as an alternative to 
traditional caller identification (also known as Caller-ID) or 
as a caller identification verification tool. 
by hardware or software when passing between networks. For 
example, between Jan. 21 and26 of2010, customers ofbanks 
in four states received calls asking them to reveal personal 65 
information, including credit card and PIN details. Many of 
these attacks used VoIP phones to anonymously and inexpen-
The prediction unit can use the features extracted by the 
characterization unit and the model learnt by the training unit 
to predict labels for new calls. The prediction unit can identify 
the codecs and the networks traversed by a new call, as well as 
uniquely identifying one or more participating phones. In 
US 9,037,113 B2 
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addition, the characteristics of the call, such as the noise 
profile, the packet loss patterns, and the types of networks 
traversed, can be sufficiently different across different calls so 
as to create a unique provenance signature for a call. Accord-
ingly, the prediction unit can identify the call audio source if 
the provenance signature has been previously encountered 
and corresponds to a known source, or the provenance signa-
ture can provide important information about the path of a 
call's audio, including for example, the source or the desti-
nation of the call audio. 
These and other objects, features, and advantages of the 
detection system will become more apparent upon reading 
the following specification in conjunction with the accompa-
nying drawing figures. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES 
FIG. 1 illustrates a diagram of an exemplary telephone call 
and use of a detection system during or after the call, accord-
ing to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. 
FIG. 2 illustrates a diagram of the detection system, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present inven-
tion. 
FIG. 3 illustrates a diagram of an exemplary combination 
of calling networks. 
FIGS. 4A-4B illustrate graphs indicating exemplary packet 
loss in a VoIP network, with a packet loss rate of approxi-
mately 5%. FIG. 4A illustrates the amplitude of a two-second 
audio signal for a call over a VoIP network, while FIG. 4B 
illustrates the corresponding short-term average energy 
(STE) for the same audio signal. 
FIG. 5 illustrates exemplary analysis of the STE of a fif-
teen-second call audio signal, encoded with G.711 and trans-
mitted through a network with 5% packet loss, where the STE 
analysis is in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of 
the present invention. 
FIGS. 6A-6B illustrate exemplary packet loss of two VoIP 
networks that use different codecs. The VoIP network corre-
sponding to FIG. 6A utilizes iLBC encoded at 30 ms of audio 
per packet, and the VoIP network corresponding to FIG. 6B 
utilizes Speex encoded at 20 ms of audio per packet. 
FIG. 7 illustrates the spectral clarity, the spectral level 
range, and deviation for 20 male and female American 
English speech samples from the Open Speech Repository, 
encoded and decoded using the five different codecs dis-
cussed herein. 
FIG. 8 illustrates how extracted features of an audio signal 
can be utilized to determine call provenance, according to an 
exemplary embodiment of the present invention. 
4 
form the same or similar functions as components described 
herein are intended to be embraced within the scope of the 
invention. Such other components not described herein can 
include, but are not limited to, similar or analogous compo-
nents developed after development of the invention. 
Various embodiments of the present invention are detec-
tion systems to determine call provenance based on audio 
analysis. Referring now to the figures, in which like reference 
numerals represent like parts throughout the views, various 
10 embodiment of the detection system will be described in 
detail. 
FIG. 1 illustrates a diagram of an exemplary telephone call 
and use of a detection system 100 during or after the call, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present inven-
15 tion. As shown in FIG. 1, a call can be a two-way communi-
cation comprising at least two call audio streams, including a 
first call audio stream from the caller to the call recipient and 
a second call stream from the call recipient to the caller. The 
detection system 100 can analyze call audio from either call 
20 stream. When used to analyze call audio directed from the 
caller to the call recipient at the call recipient's end, the 
detection system 100 can behave as a caller identification 
device or as a caller identification verifier. When used to 
analyze call audio directed from the call recipient to the caller 
25 at the caller's end, the detection system 100 can determine if 
the call is being forwarded. Each call stream of a single call 
can have a different source and destination, depending on the 
direction of the call stream. Accordingly, the term "source," 
as used herein, can refer to the caller, to a telecommunications 
30 device of the call, to the call recipient, to a telecommunica-
tions device of the call recipient. Analogously, the term 
"path," as used herein, can refer to a path in either direction 
between (on one side) the caller or the caller's telecommuni-
cations device and (on the other side) the call recipient or the 
35 call recipient's telecommunications device. 
Although FIG. 1 illustrates an embodiment of the detection 
system 100 being located at the end of each call stream of the 
call, this need not be the case. In an exemplary embodiment, 
an instance of the detection system 100 requires call audio 
40 from only a single one of the call streams in order to deter-
mine information about provenance related to that call 
stream. The detection system 100 can analyze a single one of 
the call streams, without a need to communicate additional 
information (i.e., other than the call audio) between the two 
45 sides of the two-way communication. In other words, the 
detection system 100 can be located at one end of a call, at 
both ends of the call, or may alternatively be located at a 
remote position, so as to analyze call audio during or after the 
call takes place. 
FIG. 9 illustrates an example of a suitable computing 50 
device that can be used as or can comprise a portion of the 
detection system, according to an exemplary embodiment of 
the present invention. 
In today's telephony networks, audio of a call stream may 
pass through multiple different types of networks, and meta-
data associated with the call audio may be modified between 
the networks, particularly at network gateways. In some 
cases, the only data related to a call that reliably passes 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
To facilitate an understanding of the principles and features 
of the invention, various illustrative embodiments are 
explained below. In particular, the invention is described in 
the context of being a detection system for determining call 
provenance based on audio analysis. Call provenance can be 
used to identify, verify, or provide forensic information about 
a source and path taken by a call audio. Embodiments of the 
invention, however, need not be limited to this context. 
The components described hereinafter as making up vari-
ous elements of the invention are intended to be illustrative 
and not restrictive. Many suitable components that can per-
55 between the networks is the call audio itself. The metadata 
carmot be trusted, as it is modifiable during transmission of 
the call audio. Accordingly, various embodiments of the 
present invention analyze the call audio to determine infor-
mation about a path of the call audio, such as information 
60 about the source and the networks traversed. For example, 
and not limitation, a detection system of the present invention 
can determine or verify an identity of a call audio source, 
types of one or more networks traversed, a general geography 
of the call audio source, or even an identity of one or more 
65 specific networks traversed. 
FIG. 2 illustrates a diagram of a detection system 100, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present inven-
US 9,037,113 B2 
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tion. As shown in FIG. 2, the detection system 100 can be 
embodied, in whole or in part, in a general or specialized 
computing device 900 (see FIG. 9), such as a personal com-
puter or a caller identification or verification device. For 
example, and not limitation, one or more aspects of the inven-
tion can be a computer program product that is embodied in a 
computer readable medium and is executable by one or more 
processing units of one or more computing devices 900. 
6 
A codec commonly used in PSTNs 310 is G.711, with 
North America and Japan using the mu-law compression 
algorithm and Europe and other regions using A-law. Both the 
mu-law and A-law algorithms of this codec generate a 64 
kbps (20 ms audio frames) constant bit-rate (CBR) stream for 
speech sampled at 8 kHz, which is relatively bandwidth inten-
sive when compared to other codecs. 
In cellular networks 310, the GSM full rate (GSM-FR) 
codec was the first digital cellular coding standard and is still The detection system 100 can comprise one or more units 
for processing data to determine call provenance. The units of 
the detection system 100 can be programs, program modules, 
10 widelyusedincellularnetworks310. UnlikeG.711, which is 
a waveform coder, GSM-FR uses predictive coding, which is 
more common among modem codecs and allows a large 
reduction in bandwidth requirements. GSM-FR has an aver-or other operative components of the detection system 100. These units can comprise, for example, a characterization 
unit 110, a training unit 120, and a prediction unit 130. Gen-
erally, the characterization unit 110 can extract various char- 15 
acteristics of networks through which a call stream traversed, 
based on call audio; the training unit 120 can be trained on 
prior call audio data and can learn one or more models to 
identify one or more codecs used to encode the call stream, or 
can learn to identify the geographical location of the source of 
the call stream, or can learn to identify the source of the call 
stream; the prediction unit 130 can use the features extracted 
by the characterization unit 110 and the model learnt by the 
training unit 120 to predict the codecs used to encode the call 
audio or to predict the geography of the source of the call 
stream or predict the source of the call stream. Although these 
units are described herein as being distinct components of the 
detection system 100, this need not be the case. The units are 
distinguished herein based on operative distinctiveness, but 
they can be implemented in various fashions. The elements or 
components making up the various units can overlap or be 
divided in a manner other than that described herein. 
FIG. 3 illustrates a diagram of a combination of telephony 
networks, which represents the overall calling network used 
today. As shown in FIG. 3, there are three general classes of 
telephony networks: PSTNs 310, cellular networks 320, and 
VoIP networks 330. PSTNs 310 are generally characterized 
age bit rate of approximately 13 kbps. 
Many codecs have been specifically designed for VoIP 
systems. The Internet low bit-rate codec (iLBC) is extremely 
robust to packet losses and operates on a bit rate ofl 3.33 kbps 
(30 ms audio frames) and 15.20 kbps (20 ms audio frames). 
iLBC is a mandatory standard for VoIP over cable and is also 
20 used by Google Voice™ and Skype®. Speex is a variable 
bit-rate (VBR) codec that supports a wide range of bit-rates, 
from 2.15 kbps to 44 kbps, and uses 20 ms audio frames. In 
addition to being supported on many VoIP soft phones, Speex 
is commonly used in gaming teleconferencing systems, such 
25 as Xbox Live. A large number ofVoIP systems also use G.729 
(10 ms audio frames), which requires very low bandwidth, as 
it supports a CBR of8 kbps. Skype uses G.729 as well, when 
making and receiving calls to landlines and mobile phones 
with SkypeOut or Skypein service. G.729 is also used by 
30 most Cisco hard IP phones. A number ofVoIP phones support 
G.711, which is used in PSTN 310 systems. 
Because codecs may vary between two or more connected 
networks over which an audio signal is transmitted, audio 
may be re-encoded when passing between two different tele-
35 phony networks. For instance, whereas the audio in a call 
between two PSTN users is likely to be encoded in only 
G.711, both G.711 andGSM-FRmaybe applied to the audio 
for a conversation between a user of a PSTN 310 anda user of by lossless connections and high fidelity audio. Cellular net-
works 320 have circuit-switched cores that are similar across 
different cellular networks 310. VoIP networks 330 share 40 
paths with other Internet-based traffic and thus virtually 
always experience packet loss. Various embodiments of the 
detection system 100 can determine provenance of a call by 
analyzing an audio signal of the call to identify features that 
are characteristic of these three broad types of networks and, 
45 further, to identify features that are characteristic of a specific 
network under one of the broad networks, over which the 
audio signal was transmitted. 
a cellular network 320. Encoding changes may occur in 
media gateways 350 located at the edges of telephony net-
works, so VoIP calls may traverse multiple Internet autono-
mous systems without necessarily being re-encoded. 
Through this infrastructure, phone calls are delivered seam-
lessly between users. To establish call provenance, various 
embodiments of the detection system 100 can detect charac-
teristics of underlying networks of a call and can thus deter-
mine a path or source of the call. 
The provenance of a call describes the characteristics of the 
source, traversed networks, or both the source and traversed 
networks. For example, provenance can be used to identify 
whether a call passed through a VoIP network 330 and, if such 
a passing is unexpected based on the metadata, to alert the 
receiver of the change. Provenance, as detected by an exem-
plary embodiment of the detection system 100, can distin-
Generally, voice is encoded and decoded in each of these 
networks using a variety of codecs. Specific codecs may be 
selected for different networks based on competing goals, 50 
including sound quality, robustness to noise, and bandwidth 
requirements. While a large number of codecs exist, an exem-
plary embodiment of the detection system 100 can limit its 
analysis to a predetermined set of codecs. For example, and 
not limitation, an exemplary detection system 100 can con- 55 
sider the five commonly used narrowband codecs that are 
listed in Table 1, which appears below. 
TABLE 1 
guish between traffic that has traversed different telephony 
networks: PSTN 310, cellular 320, and VoIP 330. The detec-
tion system 100 can detect provenance based only on audio 
content available at the receiving end of a call. This approach 
is attractive, because provenance may be thus determined 
Networks Codec Applications 
60 without access or modification to intermediate network ele-
ments such as gateways or routers. 
PSTN,VoIP G.711 
Cellular GSM-FR 
VoIP iLBC 
VoIP Speex 
VoIP G.729 
Standard Telephony 
Cellular Telephony 
VoIP with Cable 
Xbox ®Live 
SkypeOut, Skypein 
As a call traverses multiple networks, the audio of the call 
may be repeatedly re-encoded with the current network's 
corresponding codec. For example, a Skype call to a landline 
65 may be initially encoded using G.729 and re-encoded using 
G.711 when it encounters the VoIP-PSTN gateway 350. The 
detection system 100 can extract artifacts of each of the 
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applied codecs from the received audio and can identify the 
codec based on the extracted artifacts. Based on the identified 
codecs, the types of networks over which the audio was 
transmitted can be identified. Identifying the codec used in a 
particular network helps characterize that network. But 
because some codecs, such as G.711, are widely used in both 
PS TN 310 and VoIP networks 33 0, codec detection alone may 
be insufficient to identify the types of networks used for a call. 
Accordingly, an exemplary embodiment of the detection sys-
tem 100 can utilize other means of determining call prov- 10 
enance in addition to, or alternatively to, detecting codec 
artifacts. 
As an exemplary artifact, the detection system may look at 
the degradations introduced by networks into call audio. For 
example, VoIP networks 330 introduce packet losses, which 15 
are not seen in circuit-switched PSTN 310. Cellular networks 
8 
a break in the waveform. As shown, the packet loss can be 
more easily and more accurately detected when analyzing the 
short-term energy. 
Packet loss results in abrupt breaks in audio, which may or 
may not be detectable by a human ear. These breaks in audio 
correspond to drops in energy, which are detectable when 
examining the STE. The STE for a received audio signal y(n) 
may be defined as: 
Where En is the STE for a window of speech w(n). Specifi-
cally, w(n) is a sliding Hamming window oflength N, where 
the speech samples closer ton are weighted more heavily than 
those at the window's edge. For the codecs discussed herein, 
a packet may contain at least 10 ms of audio represented by 80 
320 may introduce bit errors due to fading effects on radio 
channels. The loss of an entire packet containing 20 ms of 
speech, as may occur in a VoIP network 330, is measurably 
different from a small number of incorrect bits, as may occur 
in a cellular network 320. Degradation is difficult, if not 
impossible, for a calling party to control. For example, and 
not limitation, an adversarial caller bounded by a lossy con-
nection cannot spoof a lossless, dedicated PSTN line. 
Accordingly, the detection system 100 can detect whether 
degradation occurred and even the specific type of degrada-
tion that occurred, so as to identify the networks over which 
20 samples of speech. By making our window length less than 
80, multiple values of En may be completely influenced by a 
dropped packet. This may results in the breaks in energy 
shown in FIG. 4B. The detection system 100 can thus detect 
packet loss by looking for a significant drop in energy, which 
an audio signal was transmitted. 
To identify and characterize the different networks a call 
traversed during a call, the detection system 100 can identify 
degradations specific to each network. A VoIP network 330 
can be identified by detecting packet loss or concealed packet 
loss in the received audio. PSTN and cellular networks 310 
and 320 can be identified and distinguished due to their dif-
ferent noise characteristics. Further, because the quality of the 
received audio significantly degrades with the number of 
networks traversed, the detection system 100 can also utilize 
quality-specific features to assist in determining call prov-
enance. 
The detection system 100 can create a feature vector that 
aggregates feature values obtained from packet loss, noise, 
and quality measurements. The feature vector is referred to 
herein as the provenance information, or a provenance fin-
gerprint, of a call audio. In some instances, the provenance 
fingerprint can be unique to a particular source or entire path 
of the call audio. The feature vector can be used to train a 
machine learning classifier 810 (see FIG. 8) to identify the 
networks that a call traversed. The feature vector can also be 
used to train a classifier that can consistently identify and 
verify a call audio source. 
25 can be followed by an energy floor and accompanied by a 
significant energy rise. 
The presence of all three of these characteristics (i.e., 
energy drop, energy floor, energy rise) may be necessary to 
detect packet loss, as each may appear individually in speech 
30 that has not experienced any packet loss. In FIG. 4B, a sig-
nificant rise in energy at approximately the two-second mark 
may be due to the start of a speech segment. This may be a 
result of voice activity detection (VAD) in VoIP systems, 
whereby packets are only sent during active speech to reduce 
35 bandwidth. Analogously, when a speech segment ends, there 
may be a significant drop in energy. 
FIG. 5 illustrates exemplary analysis of the STE of a fif-
teen-second call audio signal, encoded with G.711 and trans-
mitted through a network with 5% packet loss, according to 
40 an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. In FIG. 5, 
the lower row of dots toward the bottom of the graph repre-
sents the actual packet losses, and the upper row of dots 
represents the packet losses identified by the detection system 
100. The close correspondence between the two sets of dots 
45 illustrates that the detection system 100 can accurately iden-
tify packet loss. 
FIGS. 6A-6B illustrate exemplary packet loss of two VoIP 
networks 330 that use different codecs. The VoIP network 330 
corresponding to FIG. 6A utilizes iLBC encoded at 30 ms of 
50 audio per packet, and the VoIP network 330 corresponding to 
FIG. 6B utilizes Speex encoded at 20 ms of audio per packet. 
Each time a packet loss is detected, the detection system 100 
can also detect the length of the energy floor resulting from 
To provide further details on how an exemplary embodi-
ment can detect packet loss, it is noted that, within an IP 
network, a lost packet can be identified using the sequence 
numbers present in the metadata of each packet. These 
sequence numbers used in a first telephony network may be 55 
lost when the call is retransmitted over a second telephony 
network. The detection system 100 can identify artifacts of 
lost packets in the received audio. 
the packet loss. The detection system 100 can identify the 
specific codec used in a VoIP network 330 based on the length 
of the energy floor. As shown in FIGS. 6A-6B, for example, 
the length of the energy floor is generally larger for iLBC than 
for Speex. Analogously, because G.729 encodes 10 ms of 
audio per packet, while G.711 encodes 20 ms per packet by 
default, G.729 can be distinguished from G.711 based on the 
energy floor. 
FIGS. 4A-4B illustrate graphs indicating exemplary packet 
loss ina VoIP network 330, with a packet loss rate ofapproxi- 60 
mately 5%. FIG. 4A illustrates the amplitude of a two-second 
audio signal for a call over a VoIP network 330, while FIG. 4B 
illustrates the corresponding short-term average energy 
(STE) for the same audio signal. The detection system 100 
can analyze the amplitude, the short-term energy, or both of 65 
these aspects when searching for an indication of packet loss. 
The effect of a lost packet is sometimes visibly identifiable by 
The dropping of multiple consecutive packets can result in 
a longer energy floor than would be expected of a codec. For 
example, two consecutive dropped packets can result in an 
energy floor twice as long as expected for a particular codec. 
Two consecutive packets dropped in a network using G.729 
(10 ms audio) may show an energy floor similar to a single 
US 9,037,113 B2 
9 
packet dropped in a network using G.711 (20 ms audio). 
However, the probability of consecutive packets being 
dropped is lower that the probability of a single dropped 
packet, and the detection system 100 can identify the codec 
used based on the most commonly occurring energy floor 
length. 
10 
Given the above, to detect PLC in an audio signal, the 
detection system 100 can split the received audio into packets 
containing 30 ms audio each, which is the default for iLBC. 
The detection system 100 can then create a pitch-synchro-
nous residual from each packet and compare each created 
residual to the residual extracted from the next packet. The 
detection of an association between sequential packets can 
indicate to the detection system 100 (1) that the audio signal 
is encoded with iLBC and (2) characteristics the specific LPC 
Accordingly, STE can provide a highly accurate mecha-
nism useable by the detection system 100 to determine packet 
losses and, thereby, to determine a codec used to encode an 
audio signal. When a call traverses a potentially lossy VoIP 
network 330, the detection system 100 can detect packet loss 
rate and the codec used in that VoIP network 330. 
10 algorithm used. 
Analogously, the detection system 100 can analyze corre-
lations between packets to detect the use of other codecs, to 
detect the type of loss concealment algorithm used, and to 
detect lost packets and characteristics of packet loss. This 
15 detected information can be included in the detection sys-
tem's profile for each call, which can be used to determine call 
Some VoIP systems employ packet loss concealment 
(PLC) algorithms to prevent short speech gaps from affecting 
call quality. Such concealment can be carried out at the 
receiver (reactive) or with the assistance of the sender (pro-
active). In reactive recovery, a lost packet is concealed, with 
silence or with noise, or the lost packet is replaced by a new 
packet regenerated by interpolating previously received 20 
packets. Proactive recovery algorithms generally include 
redundant information, such as the previous packet's audio, 
with each packet, so as to enable recovery. Proactive recovery 
thus generally incurs a bandwidth overhead and is rarely 
used. Because of the rarity of proactive algorithms, the detec- 25 
tion system 100 can limit its consideration ofrecovery algo-
rithms to reactive algorithms. 
When a VoIP network 330 uses a concealment mechanism, 
such as silence or noise substitution, the STE-based algorithm 
discussed above can be used by the detection system 100 to 30 
detect packet losses by suitably adjusting the energy floor to 
correspond to the noise floor. Most VoIP codecs, however, 
reconstruct lost packets from previous packets. For example, 
G.711 uses waveform substitution to repeat a portion of the 
previous packet. In codecs designed specifically for VoIP, 35 
such as iLBC and Speex, the concealment algorithm is gen-
erally more elaborate in order to improve robustness to high 
packet loss rates. The detection system 100 may be based on 
an assumption that concealment techniques are predomi-
nantly deterministic, and thus, the detection system 100 can 40 
utilize detection techniques that exploit the correlation 
between reconstructed packets and previous packets. 
provenance. 
Accordingly, as discussed above, the detection system 100 
can determine whether a call traversed a VoIP network 330, 
determine the packet loss rate of the VoIP network 330, and 
determine the codec used in the VoIP network 330. Regarding 
call provenance, the first of the determinations can indicate 
whether a VoIP network 330 is in the path of a call, and the 
second and third determinations can characterize the one or 
more VoIP networks 330 in the call path. 
As discussed above, the detection system 100 can consider 
PSTNs 310, cellular networks 320, VoIP networks 330, or a 
combination of these network types. Accordingly, an exem-
plary embodiment of the detection system 100 can detect 
whether a call traversed one or more PSTNs 310 and one or 
more cellular networks 320, in addition to detecting VoIP 
networks 330. 
Waveform codecs, such as G.711, are used mostly in 
PSTNs 310, as these codecs capture speech without any com-
pression and require much higher bandwidth than most other 
codecs. Codecs used in PSTNs 310 tend to introduce noise 
only during speech activity, resulting in a strong correlation 
between the noise and the audio signal. This occurrence is 
known as "multiplicative noise," and its presence can be 
determined based on spectral statistic metrics: spectral level 
range and spectral level deviation. Furthermore, the spectral 
clarity for such a codec, or the measured crispness of the 
audio, is very high. In contrast, because cellular networks 320 
require efficient use of bandwidth, cellular networks 320 
generally use high compression codecs like GSM-FR. The 
spectral clarity of high-compression codecs used in cellular 
networks 320 suffers due to the significant compression. 
Spectral clarity quantifies the perceptible difference in call 
quality that is experienced when talking on a landline versus 
a mobile phone. 
FIG. 7 illustrates the spectral clarity, the spectral level 
range, and deviation for 20 male and female American 
English speech samples from the Open Speech Repository, 
encoded and decoded using the five different codecs dis-
cussed herein. As shown in FIG. 7, codecs G.711 and GSM-
FR can be clearly differentiated and identified. Accordingly, 
the detection system 100 can identify the codec used based on 
the spectral clarity, the spectral level range, and the deviation 
of the received audio signal. After the codec is identified, the 
detection system 100 can do a codec-to-network translation 
to determine if a call traversed a PSTN 310 or a cellular 
network 320. The detection system can further utilize the 
spectral clarity, the spectral level range, and the deviation to 
provide a noise profile for a received audio signal. The noise 
For clarity, further details of the PLC algorithm in iLBC are 
provided: iLBC uses a linear predictive coding (LPC) algo-
rithm to represent speech in a significantly compressed form. 45 
LPC of iLBC is generally based on the source filter model of 
speech production, where the larynx (i.e., the source) pro-
duces sound energy, which, when voiced, consists of a fun-
damental frequency (i.e., pitch) and its harmonics. The sound 
energy is then shaped by the vocal tract (i.e., the throat and 50 
mouth) into enhanced frequency bands known as formants, 
which provide speech its intonation. The LPC algorithm 
inverse-filters the formants from the speech signal to leave 
behind the original sound energy, known as the residual. The 
iLBC codec uses the residual, the synthesis filters, and 55 
dynamic codebook encoding to reduce the original speech 
into a set of parameters that can be transmitted. An iLBC 
decoder uses these parameters to reconstruct the residual and 
the synthesis filters, which re-synthesize the speech when 
combined. When a packet is lost, the decoder uses the residual 60 
from the previous packet and creates a new pitch-synchro-
nous residual for concealing the loss. Additionally, a random 
excitation is added to the new residual. The new residual and 
the synthesis filters from the previous packet are used to 
create speech that is be substituted for the lost packet. As a 
result, the new residual is strongly correlated with the previ-
ous packet's residual. 
65 profile can be further indicative of call provenance. 
Call provenance can be used (1) to identify the path tra-
versal signature (i.e., the set of networks traversed) and (2) to 
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provide a detailed characterization of each network in the 
path traversal signature. The path traversal signature can 
identify the networks that a call traversed and the codec used, 
and the characterization can provide more details of each 
network. Various features determined by analyzing the call 
audio can be stored in a corresponding feature vector, which 
is also referred to herein as the fingerprint for the call stream. 
12 
learning classifier, 810 can use a single label classifier. The 
detection system 100 can then learn the identity of the source 
device for the call audio. The next time the same device makes 
a call, the device can be identified by the detection system 
100. 
As the detection system 100 makes one or more of the various 
determinations discussed above, each determination can 
become a part of a call' s provenance fingerprint, as each such 1 o 
determination is related to how the audio data was manipu-
lated between the source of the audio stream and the destina-
tion. 
The detection system 100 can provide various outputs, 
depending on the situation. For example, and not limitation, 
exemplary embodiments of the detection system 100 can 
output (1) an alert if the metadata of a call is contradicted by 
the provenance fingerprint 820, (2) a risk/confidence score 
depending on how similar the provenance predicted informa-
tion is to metadata of a call, (3) an actual phone identity or 
telecommunications device identity, as identified by the 
detection system 100, or (4) other call source information. FIG. 8 illustrates how extracted features of an audio signal 
can be utilized to determine call provenance, according to an 
exemplary embodiment of the present invention. To obtain 
the path traversal signature, the detection system 100 can train 
a machine learning classifier 810, as shown in FIG. 8, pref-
erably using a repository of speech samples. Each audio 
sample may be subjected to codec transformations and net-
work degradations, depending on the networks traversed. For 
each audio sample, packet losses can be identified. If any 
packet losses are identified, the detection system 100 can 
calculate the packet loss rate, which can then form at least a 
part of a packet loss profile and can be added to the corre-
sponding feature vector, along with information extracted 
about codecs used. The detection system 100 can then apply 
15 The metadata can include caller identification information, in 
which case the detection system 100 can acts as a caller 
identification verifier. After the detection system 100 has 
previously encountered call audio from a first caller, later 
calls from that first caller have a provenance fingerprint 820 
20 matching the provenance fingerprint 820 of previous calls 
from the first caller. Accordingly, if a new call's metadata 
indicates that the source is first caller, but if the provenance 
fingerprint 820 of the new call does not sufficiently match the 
fingerprint 820 of previous calls from the first caller, then the 
25 detection system 100 can output an alert. Contrastingly, ifthe 
provenance fingerprint 820 of a new call matches the prov-
enance fingerprint 820 of a previous set of one or more calls 
from a known first caller, then the detection system 100 can 
indicate that the new call comes from the first caller. 
a correlation algorithm (such as that discussed above, using 
iLBC as an example) to detect packet loss concealment. If the 
correlation algorithm finds concealed losses, the correspond- 30 
ing codec can again be added to the feature vector, along with 
the number of concealed packets (PLC profile). The detection 
system 100 can also extract a noise profile for the call audio 
and add the spectral metrics to the feature vector. Because the 
quality of speech degrades with the number of networks 35 
traversed, the detection system 100 can obtain call quality 
metrics from a single ended quality tool, such as P.563, and 
add this to the feature vector as well. 
In one exemplary embodiment, a risk score for a particular 
call is calculated as a weighted and normalized sum of indi-
vidual risk scores for each label for which the provenance 
predicted value is different from the claimed metadata value. 
The actual risk score is dependent on the label being pre-
dicted. For example, if values for a network traversed are 
predicted, and the prediction indicates that the call traversed 
a VoIP network while the metadata claims that it is a purely 
PSTN call, then such a difference could potentially be 
assigned a high risk value. The weight is based on how sta-The machine learning classifier 810 can be one of many 
classifiers depending on the label being learnt. If the label 
being learnt is whether an audio sample contains the presence 
or absence of a codec, and if the number of codecs being 
considered is more than one, then the system can use a multi-
label classifier. The multi-label classifier can be trained on 
each sample's feature vector and label, where the label iden-
tifies actual information about each call. For example, and not 
limitation, the detection system 100 can consider the five 
commonly used narrowband codecs described above. Each 
sample would then have five labels, each indicating the pres-
ence or absence of one of these codecs. For example, and not 
limitation, a call audio sample that was encoded using GS M-
FR (originating at a cellular phone), re-encoded using iLBC 
(traversed a VoIP network 330), and then re-encoded using 
G.711 (received at a landline) can have a "1" forthree labels, 
GSM-FR, iLBC, and G.711, and a "O" for the two other 
labels, Speex and G.729. The multi-label classifier can use a 
set of standard reduction techniques to convert the multi-label 
data into a single-label model. The classifier 810 can then 
learn which features best predict the presence or absence of a 
label. 
For each newly received call audio, the prediction unit 130 
can perform the same procedure or a similar procedure, with-
out including a predetermined label. The machine learning 
classifier 810 of the detection system 100 can then predict a 
40 tistically confident the detection system 100 is of its predic-
tion. 
In some instances, the detection system 100 may not have 
encountered previous calls from a first caller. In this case, the 
detection system 100 can still provide forensic information, 
45 such as information about types of networks traveled by the 
call. For another example, a call between the UK and Massa-
chusetts, United States, is expected to use the Hibernia Atlan-
tic undersea telecommunication cable. If the training unit 120 
is trained with a sample of calls that traverse this telecommu-
50 nication cable, the training unit 120 can learn which features 
correlate with usage ofthis path. Thereafter, any new call that 
comes from the UK and uses this path can immediately be 
identified in that respect. Accordingly, the detection system 
100 can differentiate between a call that originated within the 
55 United States from one that originated from outside the 
United States. As described earlier, the detection system 100 
can also provide information on the type of network (VoIP, 
PSTN or cellular) a call traversed by training our training unit 
120 with a sample of calls that have traversed one or more of 
60 these networks. As a result, when the detection system 100 
carmot identify the call source precisely, useful information 
about the call source can still be provided and, in some 
instances, enough information may be provided to indicate 
that the metadata of a new call is inaccurate. 
set oflabels based on the learned model. In another exemplary 65 
embodiment the label being learnt can be a unique identifier 
for the phone producing the audio. In this case the machine 
The path traversal signature and the complete provenance 
fingerprint 820 can provide a useful security framework in the 
absence of verifiable metadata. The traversal signature alone 
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can be used against adversaries who are bound by operating 
constraints. For example, adversaries trying to spoof a dedi-
cated line to the bank may use VoIP due to the fact that they 
can remain largely anonymous and can make a large number 
of inexpensive calls. However, the path traversal signatures 
for these two calls would differ significantly. To address this, 
the adversary can switch to a landline, in which case the 
adversary would lose the ability to easily make a large number 
of calls and would potentially compromise his or her ano-
nymity. The provenance fingerprint 820 can also be used 10 
against adversaries, because the provenance fingerprint 820 
can characterize individual networks. Accordingly, an adver-
sary attempting to masquerade as a certain caller would have 
14 
fication when a connected call fails to match a call participant 
on the whitelist. Such notification can comprise, for example, 
automatically rejecting the call or automatically providing an 
alert to the first call participant. In contrast, a blacklist com-
prises a set of provenance fingerprints 820 for others with 
whom the call participant does not wish to communicate. The 
detection system 100 can automatically provide a notification 
when a connected call matches a call participant on the black-
list Such notification can comprise, for example, automati-
cally rejecting the call or automatically providing an alert to 
the first call participant. Further, when the first call participant 
participates in a call from a not-yet blacklisted or whitelisted 
second call participant, the detection system 100 can add the to replicate the various characteristics of the networks 
between the certain caller and the intended recipient. 15 second call participant to a blacklist or whitelist at the first call 
participant's request, by detecting and recording the prov-
enance fingerprint 820 of the other party to the call. A further 
benefit of the detection system 100 is that the detections 
Beneficially, various embodiments of the detection system 
100 are not dependent on a voice or accent of either call 
participant. The various mechanisms discussed above for 
analyzing call audio are generally independent of call partici-
pant voices, including voiceprint, accent, speech patterns, 20 
pitch (i.e., frequency), volume (i.e., amplitude), and various 
other voice factors. Accordingly, if a call participant attempts 
to disguise his or her voice, an exemplary embodiment of the 
detection system 100 can still succeed in properly determin-
ing and matching a provenance fingerprint. 25 
Various services and hardware products can be provided 
integrating or otherwise utilizing various embodiments of 
this invention. For example, a bank or other entity may ana-
lyze a set of recorded past calls, creating provenance finger-
prints for individual clients. When a bank client tries to acti- 30 
vate a credit card, requests a transfer, or performs various 
other financial transactions over the phone, the bank can use 
the detection system 100 to verify that the call originated from 
a legitimate client, before processing the transaction. The call 
might also be recorded, in which case the detection system 35 
100 can analyze the recorded call to determine if it came from 
system 100 can provide notifications regardless of whether 
the first call participant using the detections system 100 is the 
caller or the call recipient. Accordingly, for example, if the 
first call participant places a call to a blacklisted individual, 
the detection system 100 can alert the call participant of the 
blacklist violation. 
The detection system can also be used to create a fraud 
database, which can also be used as an exclusion list. When it 
is determined that a particular call has a fraudster as a call 
participant, then the provenance fingerprint 820 of the call 
stream originating at the fraudster can be recorded in the fraud 
database. The fraud database can be used as a blacklist by 
individuals, banks, or other entities to exclude calls from 
known fraudsters. 
As mentioned above, one or more aspects of the detection 
system 100 and related methods can be embodied, in whole or 
in part, in a computing device 900. FIG. 9 illustrates an 
example of a suitable computing device 900 that can be used 
as or can comprise a portion of the detection system 100, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present inven-
tion. 
Although specific components of a computing device 900 
are illustrated in FIG. 9, the depiction of these components in 
lieu of others does not limit the scope of the invention. Rather, 
various types of computing devices 900 can be used to imple-
ment embodiments of the detection system 100. Exemplary 
an appropriate customer. Some embodiments of the detection 
system 100 can also provide fraud prevention information, 
such as identifying that a call traversed over a VoIP network. 
Fraud prevention information can be used in conjunction with 40 
other available information, such as the client's registered 
phone or other device being a landline, to result in alerts as 
needed. Banks also call a customer as one factor in a multi-
factor authentication system. In this case the bank can use the 
detection system 100 to determine if the call has been for-
warded to a different telecommunications device as the 
resulting fingerprint will change. 
45 embodiments of the detection system 100 can be operational 
with numerous other general purpose or special purpose com-
puting system environments or configurations. Examples of 
well-known computing systems, environments, and/or con-
figurations that can be suitable for use with the invention 
Some embodiments of the detection system 100 can be 
used as, integrated into, or otherwise in communication with, 
a caller identification device or a caller identification verifier. 
The detection system 100 can analyze each incoming call and 
provide true caller identification information, based on a call 
provenance fingerprint 820, or provide an alert when the 
metadata of a call is contradicted by its call provenance fin-
gerprint 820. 
An exemplary embodiment of the detection system 100 can 
be used to create or enforce an exclusion list, such as a 
blacklist or a whitelist, for one or more call recipients, by 
populating one or more of exclusion lists with provenance 
fingerprints of recognized entities previously encountered by 
the detection system 100. For example, if a first call partici-
pant desires to receive calls only from a particular group of 
potential other call participants, the detection system 100 can 
verify that the call audio for a newly connected call matches, 
or is otherwise consistent with, a provenance fingerprint 820 
of a call participant on a whitelist for the first call participant. 
The detection system 100 can automatically provide a noti-
50 include, but are not limited to, personal computers, server 
computers, hand-held or laptop devices, multiprocessor sys-
tems, microprocessor-based systems, set top boxes, program-
mable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers, 
mainframe computers, distributed computing environments 
55 that include any of the above systems or devices, and the like. 
Exemplary embodiments of the detection system 100 can 
be described in a general context of computer-executable 
instructions, such as one or more applications or program 
modules, stored on a computer-readable medium and 
60 executed by a computer processing unit. Generally, program 
modules can include routines, programs, objects, compo-
nents, or data structures that perform particular tasks or 
implement particular abstract data types. Embodiments of the 
detection system 100 can also be practiced in distributed 
65 computing environments, where tasks are performed by 
remote processing devices that are linked through a commu-
nications network. 
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With reference to FIG. 9, components of the computing 
device 900 can comprise, without limitation, a processing 
unit 920 and a system memory 930. A system bus 921 can 
couple various system components including the system 
memory 930 to the processing unit 920. The system bus 921 
can be any of several types of bus structures including a 
memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a 
local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. By way 
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example, hard disk drive 941 is illustrated as storing an oper-
ating system 944, application programs 945, other program 
modules 946, and program data 947. These components can 
either be the same as or different from operating system 934, 
application programs 935, other program modules 936, and 
program data 937. 
of example, and not limitation, such architectures can include 
Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, Micro Channel 
Architecture (MCA) bus, Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, Video 
Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus, and 
Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus also known as 
Mezzanine bus. 
A web browser application program 935, or web client, can 
be stored on the hard disk drive 941 or other storage media. 
The web client 935 can request and render web pages, such as 
10 those written in Hypertext Markup Language ("HTML"), in 
another markup language, or in a scripting language. The web 
client 935 can be capable of executing client-side objects, as 
well as scripts within the browser environment. Additionally, 
The computing device 900 can include a variety of com-
puter readable media. Computer-readable media can be any 
available media that can be accessed by the computing device 
900, including both volatile and nonvolatile, removable and 
non-removable media. For example, and not limitation, com-
puter-readable media can comprise computer storage media 
and communication media. Computer storage media can 
include, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash 
memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital ver-
satile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic 
cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other mag-
netic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used 
to store data accessible by the computing device 900. For 
example, and not limitation, communication media can 
include wired media such as a wired network or direct-wired 
connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, RF, infrared 
and other wireless media. Combinations of any of the above 
can also be included within the scope of computer readable 
media. 
15 the web client 935 can execute web application programs, 
which can be embodied in web pages. 
A user of the computing device 900 can enter commands 
and information into the computing device 900 through input 
devices such as a keyboard 962 and pointing device 961, 
20 commonly referred to as a mouse, trackball, or touch pad. 
Other input devices (not shown) can include a microphone, 
joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, electronic white 
board, or the like. These and other input devices are often 
connected to the processing unit 920 through a user input 
25 interface 960 coupled to the system bus 921, but can be 
connected by other interface and bus structures, such as a 
parallel port, game port, or a universal serial bus (USB). A 
monitor 991 or other type of display device can also be 
connected to the system bus 921 via an interface, such as a 
30 video interface 990. In addition to the monitor, the computing 
device 900 can also include other peripheral output devices 
such as speakers 997 and a printer 996. These can be con-
nected through an output peripheral interface 995. 
The computing device 900 can operate in a networked 
35 environment, being in communication with one or more 
remote computers 980 over a network. The remote computer 
980 can be a personal computer, a server, a router, a network 
PC, a peer device, or other common network node, and can 
include many or all of the elements described above relative 
The system memory 930 can comprise computer storage 
media in the form of volatile or nonvolatile memory such as 
read only memory (ROM) 931 and random access memory 
(RAM) 932. A basic input/output system 933 (BIOS), con-
taining the basic routines that help to transfer information 
between elements within the computing device 900, such as 
during start-up, can typically be stored in the ROM 931. The 
RAM 932 typically contains data and/or program modules 
that are immediately accessible to and/or presently in opera-
tion by the processing unit 920. For example, and not limita-
tion, FIG. 9 illustrates operating system 934, application pro-
grams 935, other program modules 936, and program data 45 
937. 
40 to the computing device 900, including a memory storage 
device 981. 
When used in a LAN networking environment, the com-
puting device 900 can be connected to the LAN 971 through 
a network interface or adapter 970. When used in a WAN 
networking environment, the computing device 900 can 
include a modem 972 or other means for establishing com-
munications over the WAN 973, such as the internet. The 
modem 972, which can be internal or external, can be con-
nected to the system bus 921 via the user input interface 960 
50 or other appropriate mechanism. In a networked environ-
ment, program modules depicted relative to the computing 
device 900 can be stored in the remote memory storage 
device. For example, and not limitation, FIG. 9 illustrates 
remote application programs 985 as residing on memory 
The computing device 900 can also include other remov-
able or non-removable, volatile or nonvolatile computer stor-
age media. By way of example only, FIG. 9 illustrates a hard 
disk drive 941 that can read from or write to non-removable, 
nonvolatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk drive 951 for 
reading or writing to a nonvolatile magnetic disk 952, and an 
optical disk drive 955 for reading or writing to a nonvolatile 
optical disk 956, such as a CD ROM or other optical media. 
Other computer storage media that can be used in the exem-
plary operating environment can include magnetic tape cas-
settes, flash memory cards, digital versatile disks, digital 
video tape, solid state RAM, solid state ROM, and the like. 
The hard disk drive 941 can be connected to the system bus 
921 through a non-removable memory interface such as inter- 60 
face 940, and magnetic disk drive 951 and optical disk drive 
955 are typically connected to the system bus 921 by a remov-
able memory interface, such as interface 950. 
55 storage device 981. It will be appreciated that the network 
connections shown are exemplary and other means of estab-
lishing a communications link between the computers can be 
used. 
The drives and their associated computer storage media 
discussed above and illustrated in FIG. 9 can provide storage 65 
of computer readable instructions, data structures, program 
modules and other data for the computing device 900. For 
As discussed above in detail, various exemplary embodi-
ments of the present invention can provide an effective means 
of identifying, verifying, or providing forensic information 
about a call audio source, independent of metadata. While 
detection systems and methods have been disclosed in exem-
plary forms, many modifications, additions, and deletions 
may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of 
the system, method, and their equivalents, as set forth in the 
following claims. 
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What is claimed is: 
1. A method comprising: 
receiving, for a first call between a plurality of parties at a 
corresponding plurality of devices, data, received at a 
first device of the plurality of devices during the first call, 
representing audio from one or more other devices of the 
plurality of devices; 
determining, by a computing device, based on the data 
representing the audio received at the first device, at least 
one of a noise profile, packet loss characteristics, and 10 
speaker-independent artifacts associated with the audio 
received at the first device; and 
at least one of identifying and verifying uniquely, based on 
the at least one of the noise profile, packet loss charac- 15 
teristics, and speaker-independent artifacts associated 
with the audio received at the first device, at least a 
portion of a path of transmission of the first call between 
the plurality of devices, wherein the at least one of iden-
tifying and verifying uniquely is not dependent on meta- 20 
data associated with the first call. 
2. The method of claim 1, the plurality of parties including 
a calling party and a called party, the path of transmission of 
the first call between the plurality of devices comprising a 
path from a device of the calling party to a device of the called 25 
party. 
3. The method of claim 1, the plurality of parties including 
18 
11. The method of claim 10, the exclusion list being a 
blacklist. 
12. The method of claim 10, the exclusion list being a 
whitelist. 
13. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
determining a plurality of provenance fingerprints for a 
plurality of calls, each provenance fingerprint being 
based on characteristics detected in audio from an asso-
ciated call, and each provenance fingerprint uniquely 
identifying an associated call source; and 
compiling the plurality of provenance fingerprints into a 
fraud database. 
14. The method of claim 13, further comprising: 
determining a first provenance fingerprint for the first audio 
from the first call, wherein the provenance fingerprint is 
based on one or more characteristics of the audio from 
the first call and uniquely identifies the at least a portion 
of the path of the first call; 
matching the first provenance fingerprint to at least one of 
the plurality of provenance fingerprints in the fraud data-
base; and 
automatically providing a notification based on the match-
ing. 
15. The method of claim 1, further comprising determining 
a provenance fingerprint for the first call, wherein the prov-
enance fingerprint is based on one or more predetermined 
characteristics detected in the audio from the first call. a calling party and a called party, the path of transmission of 
the first call between the plurality of devices comprising a 
path from a device of the called party to a device of the calling 
party. 
16. The method of claim 15, wherein the provenance fin-
30 gerprint uniquely identifies the at least a portion of the path of 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one of 
identifying and verifying uniquely the at least a portion of a 
path of transmission of the first call comprises identifying a 
unique telecommunications device involved in the first call. 35 
5. The method of claim 4 wherein the telecommunications 
device is one of the corresponding plurality of devices. 
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising verifying at 
least a portion of the metadata associated with the first call 
based on the at least one ofidentifying and verifying uniquely. 40 
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one of 
identifying and verifying uniquely the at least a portion of a 
path of transmission of the first call comprises identifying a 
geography associated with a device from the one or more 
other devices. 45 
transmission. 
17. The method of claim 16, wherein the provenance fin-
gerprint identifies a unique telecommunications device 
involved in the first call. 
18. The method of claim 16, wherein the provenance fin-
gerprint uniquely identifies a geography of an origin of the 
first call. 
19. The method of claim 15, wherein determining the prov-
enance fingerprint of the first call occurs absent consideration 
of metadata associated with the call. 
20. The method of claim 19, further comprising calculating 
a risk score indicating a measure of similarity between the 
provenance fingerprint and the metadata. 
21. The method of claim 15, further comprising adding the 
provenance fingerprint to a blacklist. 
22. The method of claim 21, further comprising notifying a 
caller when a call recipient is included in the blacklist. 
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one of 
identifying and verifying uniquely the at least a portion of a 
path of transmission of the first call comprises determining 
that the first call and a second call have in common a same 
portion of the path of transmission of the first call. 
23. The method of claim 15, further comprising adding the 
50 provenance fingerprint to a whitelist. 
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one of 
identifying and verifying uniquely the at least a portion of a 
path of transmission of the first call comprises: 
determining a feature profile of the first call based on the 
data representing the audio received at the first device; 55 
and 
classifying the feature profile of the first call based at least 
in part on a plurality of feature profiles of previous calls. 
10. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
determining a plurality of provenance fingerprints for a 60 
plurality of calls, each provenance fingerprint being 
based on one or more predetermined characteristics 
detected in audio from an associated call, and each prov-
enance fingerprint uniquely identifying at least a portion 
of a path of the associated call; and 
compiling the plurality of provenance fingerprints into an 
exclusion list. 
65 
24. The method of claim 23, further comprising notifying a 
caller when a call recipient is included in the whitelist. 
25. A system comprising: 
a processor; 
a memory operatively coupled to the processor; 
a characterization unit for extracting, independent of meta-
data associated with a first call, one or more character-
istics from call audio received at only a single end of the 
first call, wherein the one or more characteristics include 
at least one of a noise profile, packet loss characteristics, 
and speaker-independent artifacts associated with the 
audio received at only the single end of the first call and 
storing the extracted characteristics in the memory; 
a training unit for learning application of one or more of 
labels to a plurality of prior call audios, based at least 
partially on characteristics detected from audio from 
prior calls; and 
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a prediction unit for predicting, with the processor, labels 
for the first call based on the learned application of the 
one or more labels from the training unit to the call audio 
of the first call. 
26. The system of claim 25, the prediction unit being con-
figured to at least one of identify and verify uniquely at least 
a portion of a transmission path of the first call, based solely 
on characteristics extracted from the audio from the first call. 
27. The system of claim 26, the prediction unit being con-
figured to at least one ofidentify and verify a unique telecom- 10 
munications device involved in the first call, based on char-
acteristics extracted from the audio from the first call. 
28. The system of claim 26, the prediction unit being con-
figured to at least one of identify and verify a geography of an 
origin of the first call, based on the characteristics extracted 15 
from the audio from the first call. 
20 
39. A method comprising: 
detecting, independent of voice analysis, one or more char-
acteristics associated with a first call solely from data 
representing audio received at only a single end of the 
first call, wherein the one or more characteristics include 
at least one of a noise profile, packet loss characteristics, 
and speaker-independent artifacts associated with the 
audio received at only the single end of the first call; 
determining, by a processor, a first provenance fingerprint 
for the first call based on the detected call characteris-
tics; and 
identifying and verifying uniquely one or more devices or 
networks spanning at least a portion of a transmission 
path of the first call. 
40. The method of claim 39, further comprising identifying 
an error in at least a portion of metadata associated with the 
first call, based on the characteristics detected in the audio 
from the first call. 
~1. The method of claim 40, further comprising calculating 
a nsk score based on a comparison of the provenance finger-
print to the metadata. 
29. The system of claim 25, the prediction unit being fur-
ther configured to determine a first provenance fingerprint for 
the first call, based on characteristics detected in the audio 
from the first call, the first provenance fingerprint indicating 20 
uniquely at least a portion of the path of the audio from the 
first call. 
42. The method of claim 39, further comprising verifying 
at least a portion of metadata associated with the first call 
25 based on the characteristics detected in the audio from the firs~ 
call. 
30. The system of claim 29, the prediction unit being fur-
ther configured to identify at least a partial match between the 
first provenance fingerprint for the first call and a second 
provenance fingerprint for a second call. 
31. The system of claim 30, the prediction unit being fur-
ther configured to identify that a unique telecommunications 
device involved in the first call is the same as a unique tele-
communications device involved in the second call based on 30 
comparing the first provenance fingerprint to the se;ond prov-
enance fingerprint. 
32. The system of claim 30, the prediction unit being fur-
ther configured to identify a common geography between an 
origin of the first call and an origin of the second call, based 35 
on comparing the first provenance fingerprint to the second 
provenance fingerprint. 
33. The system of claim 29, the characterization unit being 
further configured to identify the noise profile in the audio 
from the first call, wherein the determination of the first 40 
provenance fingerprint is based at least partially on the iden-
tification of the noise profile. 
43. The method of claim 39, further comprising identifying 
at least ?ne type of network traversed by the first call, based on 
the aud10 from the first call, wherein the determination of the 
first provenance fingerprint is based at least partially on the 
identification of the at least one type of network traversed by 
the first call. 
44. The method of claim 39, further comprising identifying 
at least one codec used to encode the first call, based on the 
audio from the first call, wherein the determination of the first 
provenance fingerprint is based at least partially on the iden-
tification of the at least one codec. 
45. The method of claim 39, further comprising detecting a 
packet-loss concealment algorithm used during transmission 
of the first call, based on the audio from the first call, wherein 
the determination of the first provenance fingerprint is based 
at least partially on the detection of the packet-loss conceal-
ment algorithm. 
46. The method of claim 39, further comprising identifying 
a geographical origin of the first call, based on the character-
istics detected in the audio from the first call. 
34. The system of claim 29, the characterization unit being 
further configured to measure quality of the audio from the 
first call, wherein the determination of the first provenance 45 
fingerprint is based at least partially on the quality of the audio 
from the first call. 
35. The system of claim 25, the training unit comprising a 
multi-label classifier. 
36. The system of claim 35, the multi-label classifier being 
configured to identify which of a predetermined plurality of 
codecs were used to encode the first call. 
~7. The method of claim 39, further comprising verifying a 
umque telecommunications device involved in the first call 
based on the audio from the first call, wherein the verificatio~ 
50 comprises: 
receiving metadata associated with the first call, wherein 
the m_etadata includes a phone number of a calling party; 
comparmg the metadata to the provenance fingerprint for 
the first call; and 
37. The system of claim 25, the training unit being further 
configured to detect one or more unique networks traversed 
by the first call. 
38. The system of claim 25, wherein the characterization 
unit, the training unit, and the prediction unit are co-located at 
the single end of the first call. 
55 pr~vi~ing notification whether the provenance fingerprint 
md1cates that the phone number in the metadata is incor-
rect. 
* * * * * 
